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On the Offensive
The banking and thrift industries have taken
the offensive with the introduction ofthe
Money Market Deposit Account (MMDA)
and its companion account, the 5uper-
NOW. These new accounts enable banks
and thrifts to compete more effectively with
money market mutual funds (MMFs).
Indeed, the Gam-51. Germain Act, passed in
October 1982, had required the Depository
Institutions Deregulation Committee(DIDO
to authorize an instrument that was directly
competitive with MMFs. Congress intended
to promote competition between the depos-
itory institutions and theMMFs by providing
for a ceiling-free deposit account with
liquidity and limited transactions capabili-
ties.
The public has found the MMDA to be an
extremely attractive instrument since it
offers the important combination ofmarket
rates, liquidity, low minimum balances and
deposit insurance. Moreover, depository
institutions are taking an aggressive market-
ing stance by offering high interest rates on
the MMDA to make ittheir chief instrument
in head-to-head competition with the MMFs.
Banks and thrifts could afford to offer higher
rates to make the MMDA more attractive
than the Super-NOW because the former is
a limited transactions account and personal
MMDAs are notsubject to reserve require-
ments. In contrast, Super-NOWbalances
are treated as transactions balances subject
to a 12-percent reserve requirement In
addition, the cost ofservicing the limited
transactions ofMMDAs is less than the cost
ofproviding unlimited checking services for
the Super-NOW.
Armed with these new accounts, depository
institutions have responded aggressively by
developing new products and services in an
effort to recapture some ofthe $232 billion
held by taxable MMFs in mid-December,
and to capture a larger portion ofnew funds
flowing into the market Some MMFs will
continue to offer features currently not
available from depository institutions, such
as accounts tied to securities transactions
and brokerage services, speCific investments
(i.e., eurodollarsl whichofferahigher return
with more risk, or tax-exempt funds. These
segments ofthe market will continue to
remain fairly insulated from direct competi-
tion with depository institutions. The buIk of
MMF balances, however, will be subject to
competitive pressure from the MMDAs.
Promotional blitz
To introduceMMDAsand, toa lesser extent,
Super-NOWs, depository institutions con-
ducted atremendous promotional blitz.
Full-page advertisements and TVspots high-
lighted those features ofthe MMDAs not
shared by the MMFs, including FDIC/FSLlC
deposit insurance ofup to $100,000 per
depositor, the convenience ofholdingthe
account at a "full service" institution,
and access to funds via automated teller
machines. As ifthese features were not
enough to attract depositors, a wide variety
of attractive bonuses ranging from cash to
travel offers were thrown in as sweeteners.
In addition, banks and thrifts took full advan-
tage ofthe ceiling-free interest rate feature of
MMDAs and Super-NOWs by offering
premium rates well above the market yield
paid by MMFs to attract the public's atten-
tion and to overcome depositor inertia.
While many institutions offered "intro-
ductory" rates inthe 10-to 12-percent range
for MMDAs, afew paid annual rates of 20
percent or more. Institutions competed
against each other with these premium rates
in an attempt to capture a larger share of the
market As expected, the introductory
premiums have deClined recently, and
MMDA rates have moved into closer align-
ment with short-term market rates, settling
slightly above MMF yields.
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Balance sheets restructured
As ofearly April, the MMDA had drawn
more than $333 billion, perhaps $70 billion
ofwhich came from outside the banking
system (perhaps $40 billion from MMFs and
the rest from instruments such as Treasury
bills). In fact, the MMDA has had the most
rapid growth ofanyoftheconsumerdeposit
instruments ever authorized. Its growth has
been even more dramatic than that experi-
enced by the MMFs during 1980 and 1981.
In contrast, the lower rates paid on Super-
NOWs and the decision by many banks to
"soft-pedal" the account have resu Ited in its
much slower growth. Atthe end ofMarch,
Super-NOWs had grown to about $28 bil-
lion, and attracted only a small percentage
ofnew deposits.
Although the taxable MMFs have lost over
$50 billion since these accounts were intro-
duced, depository institutions have been
drawingmoney primarilyfrom theirexisting
deposit bases-consumers and businesses
with small-denomination time deposits and
passbook savings accounts. Furthermore,
commercial banks reported sizable reduc-
tions in large time deposits outstanding as
some large certificates of deposit (CDs over
$100,000) were converted intoMMDAsand
as the inflowoffunds into the MMDAs
allowed institutions to reduce their need to
issue large CDs.
••• But at what cost?
The popularity ofthe MMDA has not been
without cost. Earnings at depository institu-
tions wiII be affected adversely by the con-
version of lowercost liabilities into MMDAs
and Super-NOWs. (While the majority of
the internal funds converted into MMDAs
was already payingmarket rates, most ofthe
money flowing into Super-NOWs has come
from low-yielding checking and NOW
accounts.) In addition, earnings will suffer
temporarily because of the introductory
marketing costs and premiums paid to
attract funds into the new accounts.
To minimizethe negative impactofMMDAs
and Super-NOWs on earnings, depository
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institutions are developing more sophisti-
cated fee schedules. Some institutions have
raised service charges and fees to offset the
costs ofproviding checking services with
these accounts. Others pay different interest
rates depending on the size ofbalances, or
scale service charges according to the bal-
ance held in the account in ordertosegment
deposits by fee and rate sensitivity.
Banks and thrifts also face several poten-
tially costly risks associated with their
increasing reliance on these short-term
variable-rate liabilities. First, the popularity
ofthe new accounts has reduced the effec-
tive maturity and thus increased the sensi-
tivity ofthe cost ofbank liabilities to inteyest
rate movements. This development could
weigh heavily on the sensitivity of an insti-
tution's profits to changes in short-term
interest rates, unless other asset adjustments
are made. Second, the liquid nature ofthese
deposits increases the possibility of"rate
wars" breaking out among competing insti-
tutions. Thus, those institutions relying on
the MMDA and Super-NOW as potential
core deposits are linking awide variety of
banking services to the accounts to prevent
their loss to institutionsoffering higher yields.
The future?
Whatare the prospects forthe MMFsand the
depository institutions offering the MMDAs
and Super-NOWs? First, it is unlikely that
the MMF industry will disappear. Existing
regulations allow them to collect funds
nationwide, to provide unique services
(especially in brokerage-related products),
to tailortheir risk-return mixand tax status to
specific investors' preferences, and to allow
unlimited numbers ofchecks without the
imposition ofreserve requirements. By dif-
ferentiating their product, perhaps some
MMFscan limitcompetition with depository
institutions. Those MMFsthat try to compete
will likely offer improved payments services
and/or private insurance as important seil-
ing points. Moreover, MMFs will have
incentives to reduce operatingcosts and fees
to boost the net yields offered.7.5
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Over time, a numberofother factors will
also come into play in determining the abil-
ity ofbanks' and thrifts' to offer competitive
rates on MMDAs. General movements in
short-term interest rates, which determine
MMF yields with a lag, and their ability to
manage their portfolios, as well as their
ability to offer attractive services at a cost
that is competitive with MMFs' costs, couId
very well determine the extent to which
depository institutions are able to lure funds
away from MMFs.
In the long-run, these qualifications could
offset the advantages arising from deposit
insurance and differential reserves. Never-
theless, depository institutions are currently
making the mostoftheirabilitytodetermine
theirown rates on MMDAs and ofthe other
advantages theyhave to outbid the MMFs in
the battle for liquid, market-return core
deposits.
RATES ON MMDAs AND MMFs
Conclusion
Depository institutions will continue to
press the advantages they have gained with
the new instruments. To date, both large and
small banks have been able to outbid the
MMFs, and thus, to attract billions. The
MMDA has indeed proven to be "directly
competitive" with a money fund account.
Depository institutions should continue to
dominate the market and turn a profit now
that they can offer these accounts and price
them according to their demand for funds,
investment opportunities, interest margins,
and desired market share.
Gary C. Zimmerman and Jennifer l. Eccles
the rate depository institutions would other-
wise be willing to pay by 20 to 30 basis
points. The MMFs receive a lower return on
these assets, and, because they currently
hold nearly 18 percentoftheir assets in CDs,
the reduced return forces them to pay a
loweryield totheir shareholders. (Ofcourse,
not all MMFs will be affected to the same








MMDA DEPOSITS AND MMF SHARES
Deposit insurance on the new accounts is
the key feature for small institutions with
limited access tothe national money
markets. In the pre-MMDA world, these
institutions had difficulty obtaining funds at
the "best" bank rates because of their small
size and restricted local markets. When they
were able to tap the national markets for
uninsured purchased funds (large CDs,
primarily), they typically paid a significant
risk premium to do so.
Institutions (typically larger banks) that
already had access to the national markets·
for purchased funds at the "best" bank rate
have found that reserve requirement differ-
entials, rather than deposit insurance,
provide them with a major competitive
advantage over the MMFs. MMDAdeposits
in personal accounts do not carry a reserve
requirement, while large CDs purchased
from depository institutions by MMFs and
other non-personal investors have athree-
percent reserve requirement. At present, the
higher reserve requirement on CDs lowers
The MMDA has generated net inflows at
most institutions sufficient to reduce their
need for purchased funds. In addition, since
the fees these banks and thrifts pay for
deposit insurance are typically lower than
the risk premia they would have had to pay
to obtain funds in the national markets, the
MMDA has significantly lowered the mar-
ginal cost offunds for smaller institutions.
For many, the cost ofobtaining funds
through the MMDA is so much lowerthan
that ofobtaining funds on the open market
that they should be able tooffer higheryields
than the MMFs and still find that their
marginal cost for MMDAs is below their
marginal cost for open market borrowings.
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For depositoryinstitutions, the prospects are
bright. MMDAs have opened an important
market in which deposit insurance and
differential reserve requirements on
various categories ofdepositswill give them
important advantages over the money
market funds.LlOl8U!YSE'M 0 YPln • u08;;:.uO • PPPAClN • 0YPPI
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Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments'" 163,867 193 5,096 3.2
Loans (gross, adjusted) -total# 142,726 97 5,235 3.8
Commercial and industrial 44,763 - 407 1,950 4.6
Real estate 57,057 - 41 30 0.1
Loans to individuals 23,518 62 248 1.1
Securities loans 3,195 1,202 1,172 57.9
U.S. Treasury securities" 8,220 41 1,878 29.6
Other securities" 12,920 56 - 2,017 - 13.5
Demand deposits - total# 41,914 -1,093 926 2.3
Demand deposits - adjusted 29,218 - 334 800 2.8
Savings deposits - totalt 66,429 - 155 34,641 109.0
Time deposits - total# 67,157 366 - 23,508 - 25.9
Individuals, part. & corp. 59,964 356 - 21,256 - 26.2
(Large negotiable CD's) 20,633 174 - 12,554 - 37.8
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings
















" Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts, Super~NOW accounts, and NOWaccounts.
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